UK

Education, legislation, corrections and cybersecurity: parliamentary responses to misinformation

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Road sign saying 'Fake News' on it, with a background of blue sky and clouds.

By Elise Uberoi and Anne-Lise Harding, UK House of Commons Library

Misinformation is a critical challenge for modern democracies: it has the potential to damage the relationship between citizens and their parliament, undermining trust and democratic legitimacy. Improving these relationships between parliaments and their citizens is central to the activities of members of IPEN (International Parliament Engagement Network). Here, we consider how different parliaments have responded to the challenge of misinformation.

Data and methods

We submitted a request for information to the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD), asking parliaments if they see misinformation as a threat and why, how they address it, and how involved politicians have been in shaping these initiatives. We received responses from Austria, Estonia, the European Parliament, France, Georgia, Germany, Poland, and Portugal. We also asked IPEN members for their views and interviewed officials from the New Zealand and Irish Parliaments and the Canadian Library of Parliament.

We are keen to learn how other parliaments conceive and address misinformation, so please do get in touch if you have any thoughts. But for now, here is what we have found.

What is misinformation?

We use misinformation loosely here to capture intentionally spreading false information (disinformation), unintentionally spreading false information (misinformation), and information that misrepresents some truth to generate false inferences with malicious intent (malinformation). This is because intent can be difficult to establish, and because the effects of false information may be felt regardless of its intentionality.

Scholars note that social and digital media have increased the speed at which misinformation spreads and point out that hostile actors – including foreign states – have used these platforms to manipulate publics and politicians, polarise debates and interfere in elections.[1]

How do parliaments understand the threat of misinformation?

Very dark and menacing looking clouds in a wide landscape
Storm, Credit: texaus1, CC BY 2.0

The parliaments we heard from all agreed that misinformation poses a threat.

Some emphasised how misinformation entails security risks, notably when hostile foreign countries spread false information to manipulate parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, but also public opinion, to increase confusion and polarisation. This could undermine public trust in democratic institutions, influence voter behaviour and interfere with democratic processes, including reasoned, evidence-based debate and scrutiny (Estonia, European Parliament, France, Germany (Bundesrat)). The German Bundestag groups the security threat posed by disinformation with those posed by espionage, cyberattacks and sabotage.

Box: Misinformation as a security threat

In New Zealand, misinformation about vaccines during the coronavirus pandemic contributed to protests that resulted in an occupation of Parliament’s grounds in January 2022. The protest turned violent before it was ended in March.

The above also already points to a second way of thinking about misinformation, as an epistemic threat that can interfere with the need for political decision-making to be based on facts, and for political reporting to be factually accurate (Austria). Canadian officials noted how the advent of generative AI makes it harder to distinguish fact from fake, including for images and videos. Meanwhile, Oireachtas officials noted the historical link between partisan politics and misinformation, with misinformation previously spreading through face-to-face interactions.

The importance of facts for political decisions is well captured in this quote from a speech by the Speaker of the French National Assembly to the Speakers of the G7 Parliaments (September 2025): “Our duty, as legislators, is to give truth the means to defend itself. This is a condition for the survival of our parliamentary democracies.”  

How do parliaments respond to misinformation?

Parliaments consider misinformation in committee activity and plenary debates, with particular attention to misinformation relating to elections. In many cases, responses to misinformation are delivered through government ministries and associated bodies.

For example, the Service de vigilance et protection contre les ingérences numériques étrangères (VIGINUM) in France aims to analyse foreign disinformation campaigns, and alert authorities and the public to these. In Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior hosts a working group and a task force that coordinate relevant activity across ministries. And in Ireland, there is a national counter disinformation strategy prepared and implemented under the auspices of the Department of Culture, Communication and Sport. Meanwhile in Austria, the parliamentary administration initiated relevant activities themselves, including a strong focus on providing accurate information and explaining the dangers of misinformation.  

The main components of responses to misinformation in most parliaments were education and legislation, while some also emphasised correcting false information and cyber security measures.

Education

Parliaments highlighted that education plays a key role in countering misinformation. This includes educating MPs, parliamentary staff and the public about topical issues.

This is done by providing accurate and freely accessible information, written by experts and subject to proportionate quality assurance processes (Austria, France, Canadian Library of Parliament). This entails having robust research processes that assess methodologies and sources, to maintain accuracy and impartiality (Ireland). Having accurate information readily available, they hope, means misinformation is less likely to take hold.

Some parliaments also produce briefings and other resources on misinformation to help raise awareness of key issues (Austria, Estonia, Germany, Ireland).

Moreover, many parliaments provide training to MPs, their staff, and in some cases the public, on information literacy, helping them recognise the characteristics of false information, including deepfakes (Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Poland). Parliaments are also developing training and guidelines for their staff on the responsible use of AI (Canadian Library of Parliament, New Zealand).

In New Zealand, researchers responding to requests for information by parliamentarians include information on the methods and sources they use, effectively teaching their customers about the characteristics of good information. They present an overview of the facts, include alternative views and, when requested, trace the origins of false information.

Legislation

Parliaments have also introduced legislation to counter misinformation. This has mostly focused on regulating digital markets and the media.

The EU has introduced legislation covering various aspects of misinformation, including most significantly the Digital Services Act. This act aims to combat the viral spread of false content, including by requiring social media companies to offer transparency about their algorithms and requiring very large online platforms to develop some mitigations against key misinformation risks.

In France, the creation of deepfakes is banned, and media can be stopped from airing foreign propaganda. In Poland, regulation has focused on blocking access to illegal content.

Portugal has taken a more direct approach to legislating against misinformation. Individuals were granted protection from disinformation under the Portuguese Human Rights Charter in the Digital Era, with opportunities for redress through a regulator. However, following a Constitutional Court ruling, this act was amended to provide protection from disinformation to society, rather than individuals.

Some countries note how some forms of misinformation are covered by criminal law, for example the offence of foreign agents spreading false information with the aim of harming Poland or its allies in the Polish Penal Code (Poland), and more generally, libel and defamation offences (Poland, Georgia).

Corrections

Most parliaments do not actively monitor and correct misinformation. However, Austria and Estonia attempt to refute misinformation on the work of parliament and government in media and social media where possible. In France, the Sénat launched a website that dispels common myths about the senate and its senators.

Cyber security

In addition to training related to cyber security, some parliaments are taking steps to enhance their IT systems. For example, Austria is developing digital watermarks to avoid the use of their video archive for deepfakes. In Germany (Bundesrat), documents are only archived after they are signed so they cannot be manipulated. Poland is taking additional measures to protect parliamentary IT systems. Meanwhile in Ireland, the cyber security team is proactively providing information to staff through information and update emails and training.

A large water damn, with a background of mountains.
Hoover Dam. Credit: Bureau of Reclamation, CC BY-SA 2.0

Conclusions

Parliaments recognise the threat misinformation poses to democracy and its processes. Their responses cover different dimensions, emphasising education, regulating digital communications, correcting false information and improving cyber security. These approaches aim to make it harder for false information to be created, spread and believed, and to provide reliable information to take its place.

Better information about parliaments should help citizens gain greater awareness of their roles and work, which is often seen as a first step towards greater engagement and participation. And it seems plausible that citizens who are knowledgeable and engaged would be less likely to believe false information about their parliaments.

Given this link between awareness and engagement, it is worth noting that none of the people we heard from in our study mentioned their parliaments’ wider public engagement work. It is this work that IPEN celebrates and promotes: the different ways parliaments try to help citizens understand what they are about, but also bringing the voices of their citizens into their processes, giving people opportunities to be heard, ensuring democracy is not only about evidence-based decision making but also about reflecting the views of the people. Parliaments’ public engagement activities and misinformation work overlap in aiming to build trust in parliamentary democracy and maintaining democratic legitimacy. Recognising this shared aim may help to further align and improve activities and outcomes.

[1]  See also: Sander van der Linden, Ullrich Ecker & Stephan Lewandowsky, ‘Misinformation is a threat to society – let’s not pretend otherwise’, LSE blog, 8 October 2024 [accessed 2 February 2026]; Gilad Abiri & Johannes Buchheim, Beyond True and False: Fake News and the Digital Epistemic Divide, 29 Mich. Tech. L. Rev. 59 (2022), pp59-109

Politicising Deliberation? Media coverage of Climate Assemblies in France and the UK

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People at tables engaging in activities for UK Climate Assembly

IPEN hosted a seminar last month on the topic of politicisation of deliberative democracy initiatives. The seminar explored arguments around the institutionalisation and the politicisation of deliberative mini-publics, and the relationship between the two.

Our speakers, Professor Alice Moseley and Dr Lise Herman from Exeter University, showed that how the media portrayed the French and UK climate assemblies helped to frame the focus and nature of public discussion of their results.

Alice and Lise set out different perspectives around the presentation of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) as politicised processes. Whilst many commissioners of DMPs sought to frame them as apolitical, the presenters supported the view that politicisation – more public debate and contestation around DMPs – was actually crucial to increasing their effectiveness, not least in allowing the public to challenge existing policies and the status quo. They argued that oppositional media coverage was helpful to increasing public engagement and securing a bigger impact than they currently appeared to achieve. This under-achievement was partly due to their largely ad hoc, rather than institutionalised, nature.       In comparing the French and UK climate-based citizens’ assemblies, the presenters set out the differences in media coverage in the context of the more political origins of the French Assembly – established by President Macron’s government – against those of the UK Climate Assembly, which was established by cross-party committees of Parliament.

The speakers summarised the key differences between the two assemblies in Table 1.

Table 1: Explaining differences in politicisation

The seminar covered how politicisation was measured and set out how the French Assembly secured more engagement from political actors and more diverse media coverage. The more politicised coverage in the French media focussed more on impact, whilst the UK coverage tended to centre on the process itself.

Ultimately, they argued, if DMPs were properly institutionalised, through law or codification, debate could focus on outputs and citizens might secure more of an agenda-setting role in the choice of subject to be considered.

During a rich subsequent discussion, the importance of the commissioning body was emphasised: only the Government could provide the mandate which could link DMP outcomes to actual decision making. Full transparency with regard to how the outputs would be used was vital for both legitimacy and public confidence.

There was a good discussion around the use of the term “politicisation”, which had a slightly different nuance in a parliamentary than an academic context, but the overall sense was that public debate around DMPs was vital to increase their legitimacy, provided that this didn’t put greater institutionalisation at risk. The cross-party approach to institutionalisation in Scotland was mentioned.     

Finally, there was discussion on how regulatory bodies may use DMPs for different purposes, such as evidence gathering, in order to bolster accountability. The seminar was chaired by Chris Shaw, member of the IPEN Executive Board and a clerk in the UK Parliament, and attended by 26 participants, from a range of countries and organisations.